Short-sales constraints and the diversification puzzle by Reed, Adam et al.
Short-Sales Constraints and the Diversification Puzzle∗
Adam Reed† Pedro A. C. Saffi‡ Edward D. Van Wesep§
This Draft: July 23, 2019
Abstract
Disagreement about stock valuation, combined with short-sales constraints, can in-
crease asset prices. We build a model showing that, so long as investor beliefs are not
perfectly correlated, investors will disagree less about the value of a conglomerate than
about each of its individual divisions. This generates a conglomerate discount, with
disagreement and short-sales constraints being complementary in explaining its cross-
sectional variation. We test these predictions empirically and find substantial support:
conglomerates have lower differences of opinion and lower short-sales constraints than
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1 Introduction
One of the basic tenets of financial economics is that arbitrage opportunities will be ex-
ploited by investors, ensuring that securities are correctly priced relative to their cash flows.
This implies that the value of a portfolio of securities should be equal to the sum of the values
of its individual components. However, arbitrage activity might be limited by frictions that
make trading expensive or difficult to implement. The key insight of Miller (1977) is that
disagreement, combined with short-sales constraints, can lead to overpricing. If pessimistic
investors cannot incorporate their beliefs into prices, then the value of securities is driven by
optimists. Within the context of individual asset prices, this intuition leads to clear, testable
implications, many of which have been thoroughly explored in the literature.1
In this paper, we develop the idea that disagreement and short-sales constraints help explain
the conglomerate diversification “puzzle” (e.g., Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek
(1995)). The puzzle is why conglomerates, which can be thought of as portfolios of individual
divisions, tend to trade at a discount relative to portfolios of pure-play firms operating in
the same segments.2 We formally model an argument advanced nearly forty years ago by
Miller (1977): investors should disagree less about the value of a conglomerate than about
the values of pure-play firms.3 This follows for precisely the same reason that a portfolio’s
total variance is less than the variances of the components of the portfolio: so long as opinions
about all of the divisions of a conglomerate are not perfectly correlated, opinions about the
group will be less varied than opinions about each component. Meanwhile, in the presence
1The idea that short-sales constraints can lead to overpricing has been explored both theoretically and
empirically. In addition to Miller (1977), the predictions from a theoretical perspective are explored by Hong
and Stein (2003), Ofek and Richardson (2003), Hong et al. (2006), and Blocher et al. (2013). The predictions
have been validated empirically by Asquith et al. (2005), Diether et al. (2002), Chen et al. (2002), and Boehme
et al. (2006)
2A rich literature investigates the causes of the diversification discount. Existing explanations include the
ideas that (i) the diversification is sub-optimal and causes low profitability, (ii) less profitable firms optimally
choose to diversify, and (iii) the entire literature is a statistical mirage generated by poor matching of con-
glomerate and stand-alone firms. For examples of these explanations see Jensen (1986), Rajan et al. (2000),
Scharfstein and Stein (2000), Maksimovic and Phillips (2002), Campa and Kedia (2002), Villalonga (2004b),
Custo´dio (2014), and Hund et al. (2016). See Maksimovic and Phillips (2013) for a comprehensive survey.
3Miller (1977) says, “The existence of non-homogeneous valuations of securities among investors has impli-
cations not only for the prices of particular securities, but also for the valuation of firms formed by mergers, of
conglomerates, and of closed end investment companies...the total value of the stockholders’ investment might
be maximized by splitting the company into several parts, and letting the value of each part be set by those
investors who value its attributes.”
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of short-sales constraints, disagreement leads to overpricing. The greater the disagreement
about the asset’s value, the more severe the overpricing will be.4 This correspondence exists
because short-sales constraints prevent pessimistic views from being fully reflected in asset
prices, and more disagreement implies a larger number of pessimistic investors. Combining
these facts implies that conglomerates should trade at a discount relative to pure plays: the
diversification discount should exist.
The model works along similar lines to Blocher et al. (2013), and its key contribution is that
it allows for variation along two dimensions: disagreement among investors and endogenous
short-sales constraints. There are two types of investors and two firms with publicly traded
shares. Investors have downward-sloping demands for each company’s shares, though they
may disagree about which company they prefer. Type 1 investors weakly prefer company A
and type 2 investors weakly prefer company B, though, depending on prices, either type of
investor could be long or short either firm’s shares.5
The key friction is that only a certain fraction of shares held by long investors is available
for borrowing.6 Similar to Blocher et al. (2013), this restriction in the equity lending market
yields overpriced shares. We then compare the prices of each of these firms individually to the
price of the merged entity and show that the merged entity’s share price will be weakly lower
than the prices of the stand-alone firms – a diversification discount will arise. This is precisely
the intuition of Miller (1977), but we are the first to explicitly model this argument, allowing
for more nuance than intuition alone can generate.
From the model, we investigate four empirical hypotheses related to how conglomerates
and pure-play firms differ. First, differences of opinion should be smaller for conglomerates
than for pure plays. If this assumption is not true, then the underlying intuition of the model
4When we use the term “overpriced,” we mean that the price is higher than would arise without short-sales
constraints.
5There is an inherent link between disagreement among investors about the valuation of a given stock, and
the degree to which beliefs can “cross” regarding the valuations of different stocks, e.g., Hwang et al. (2016).
For example, it is possible that investor X is bullish on both stock A and stock B, while investor Y is bearish
on both. In this case, there is substantial disagreement, but beliefs do not cross. It is also possible that
investor X is bullish on stock A and bearish on stock B, while investor Y has opposing beliefs. In this case,
there is substantial disagreement, but beliefs cross. However, if investors do not disagree much about stock A,
then there is no scope for beliefs about stock A and stock B to cross. Crossing requires disagreement, though
disagreement does not require crossing.
6We initially assume that the fraction made available is exogenous, though we endogenize that fraction, and
the associated lending fee, later in the model’s development.
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would be invalid.7 Second, short-sales constraints should be lower for conglomerates than for
pure plays. Third, the conglomerate discount should be larger when the conglomerate has a
higher supply of shares available to borrow and lower loan fees relative to its imputed pure-
play constituents. Because differential short-sales constraints are responsible for differential
valuations of conglomerates and pure plays, it should not be surprising that as the relative
difference in constraints grows, the pricing gap should grow. Fourth, higher differences of
opinion among investors about the value of the firm increase the conglomerate discount, more so
when short sales are constrained. This interaction exists because disagreement and constraints
are complementary in raising prices. Without constraints, disagreement does not raise prices,
and without disagreement, constraints cannot exist.
We test the first hypothesis, that investors will have larger differences in opinion about the
valuation of pure plays than the valuation of conglomerates, using the standard deviation of
analysts’ earnings forecasts to measure differences of opinion. We find that when a firm has
fewer segments, differences of opinion are higher. For instance, in a propensity-score matched
sample, conglomerates exhibit almost 30% less dispersion of analysts’ forecasts relative to
pure-play firms.
The second hypothesis states that conglomerates should have lower short-sales constraints
than pure plays. Using equity lending data from Markit from 2006 through 2015, we compute
three measures of short-sales constraints: lendable supply, fee score (see Porras Prado et al.
(2016)), and fee volatility (Engelberg et al. (2016)). We find that conglomerates have higher
lendable supply, lower lending fees, and lower fee volatility than pure plays. For instance,
conglomerates have 12% higher lendable supply than matched pure-play firms, consistent with
our hypothesis. Papers such as D’Avolio (2002) have established that short-sales constraints
are less binding for certain firms, such as large firms, so we are careful to show that these
results are robust to including firm characteristics such as size, institutional ownership, analyst
coverage, liquidity, and a number of other potential confounding factors.
The third hypothesis states that tighter short-sales constraints faced by pure-play firms
7In the Online Appendix, we consider a setting in which there can be greater differences of opinion re-
garding conglomerates. Naturally, the prediction of a conglomerate discount depends critically on whether the
differences of opinion are larger or smaller for conglomerates. When we empirically confirm that conglomerates
feature lower differences of opinion than pure-plays, the remaining predictions should hold as well.
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should lead to larger conglomerate discounts. We measure excess valuation of a firm as the
difference in the enterprise value-to-sales multiple relative to an industry benchmark. This
benchmark is defined as the average of all pure-play firms operating in the same SIC industry
2-digit code. If the firm is a conglomerate, we calculate an imputed value using the sales-
weighted average of the pure-play firms operating in each of the conglomerate’s segments,
similar to the approach by Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995). We also use
the same approach to compute measures of short-sales constraints for each firm and show that,
when it is more difficult to short the benchmark pure plays, the excess valuation decreases. For
example, we find a 10% difference in the excess valuation measure relative to its mean due to
interquartile range (IQR) variation in imputed lendable supply.8 These results are robust to a
range of possible diversification measures and proxies for short-sales constraints. Overall, the
results show that short-sales constraints affect the cross-section of the conglomerate discount;
when short-sales constraints on pure plays are more severe, conglomerates exhibit lower excess
valuation.
The fourth hypothesis states that differences of opinion and short-sales constraints are
complementary in explaining cross-sectional variation in the diversification discount. We find
this in the data. For instance, once we account for interaction effects, the difference in the
excess valuation due to a one IQR increase in imputed lendable supply is 12% higher for firms
in the top quartile of imputed differences of opinion than for those in the bottom quartile of
imputed differences of opinion. In other words, consistent with the predictions of the model,
the effect of fewer short sales constraints for pure-play benchmarks is higher when they also
exhibit higher disagreement. We find this to be true in both univariate and multivariate
settings, controlling for a variety of confounding factors.
In establishing these empirical results, we recognize that there are a number of relevant
methodological issues discussed in the conglomerate discount literature. One of the main
criticisms of the methodology employed by Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995)
is that matching conglomerate firms to imputed values taken from pure plays uses benchmark
firms that are very different from conglomerates. For instance, Hund et al. (2016) mention
that, “the Berger and Ofek [1995] procedure matches diversified firms to focused firms that are
8The interquartile range (IQR) variation is the difference between the 75th and 25th percentile values.
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15 times smaller on average.” Thus, the existence of the conglomerate discount might be due
to sample selection bias (e.g., Villalonga (2004b), Custo´dio (2014), and Hund et al. (2016)). To
rule out this possibility, all of our analyses are performed on a matched sample using propensity-
score matching as in Villalonga (2004b) and Custo´dio (2014). In our matched sample, we
find that the diversification discount is still positive. Importantly, regardless of whether the
diversification discount is positive on average, the combination of short-sales constraints and
differences of opinion should generate variation in the discount in the cross section. To further
generate an apples-to-apples comparison, we also conduct an event study around diversification
events when a pure-play firm reports becoming a conglomerate for the first time, and we
find that the change in the discount is related to the change in disagreement and short sales
constraints.
The ideas in this paper mainly relate to two branches of the financial economics literature:
short selling and the diversification discount. In the area of short selling, theoretical arguments
by Miller (1977), Hong and Stein (2003), Ofek and Richardson (2003), and Hong et al. (2006)
suggest that stocks will be overvalued if frictions impede short sellers. Empirically, a number
of papers such as Boehmer et al. (2010), Asquith et al. (2005), Diether et al. (2002), and
Chen et al. (2002) explore this relationship, and overall, these papers generally confirm the
idea that short selling frictions are associated with overvaluation. A large literature examines
the diversification discount (e.g., Lang and Stulz (1994), Jensen (1986), Rajan et al. (2000),
Scharfstein and Stein (2000), Maksimovic and Phillips (2002), Amihud and Lev (1981), Lamont
and Polk (2002) and Mitton and Vorkink (2007, 2011)). Maksimovic and Phillips (2013)
provide an excellent survey. Measurement issues have also been used to explain (or deny)
the existence of the discount (e.g., Campa and Kedia (2002), Villalonga (2004a), Villalonga
(2004b), Custo´dio (2014) and Hund et al. (2016)).
Although developed somewhat differently, two contemporaneous papers share elements of
our key insights relating divergence of opinions and short sale constraints to the diversification
discount. Hwang et al. (2016) empirically explores how disagreement generates different pricing
for portfolios of financial assets relative to when they trade individually. They test their
approach on a variety of settings, including exchange traded funds (ETFs), closed-end funds,
and M&As, and the valuation of conglomerates. In the context of spin-offs, Bhandari (2016)
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develops and tests a Jarrow (1980)-type model.
Our key variables have explanatory power beyond standard explanations for the conglom-
erate discount discussed in the literature, such as differences in risk and expected returns
(Lamont and Polk (2002)), idiosyncratic risk (Amihud and Lev (1981)), and return skewness
(Mitton and Vorkink (2007, 2011)). We also employ alternative classifications of firm diversi-
fication, such as the number of segments in the conglomerate and the Hirschman-Herfindahl
index of within-firm sales. In all cases, our key variables partially explain the relative valuation
of conglomerates and pure-play firms.
2 Model
Let there be two types of investor i ∈ {1, 2} and two stocks j ∈ {A,B}. Without loss
of generality, investor of type 1 prefers stock A, and investor of type 2 prefers stock B. We
call investor 1 (2)“optimistic” about stock A (B), and “pessimistic” about stock B (A). Each
investor is infinitesimal, and each type is found in unit mass. Demand of investor type 1 is
DA1 = 1 + α− pA
DB1 = 1− α− pB,
while demand of investor type 2 is the reverse:
DA2 = 1− α− pA
DB2 = 1 + α− pB.
The downward-sloping demand curves are based on the framework in Blocher et al. (2013).
While demand can be highly elastic, it should still depend on the price of the asset, which is
determined in equilibrium by the interaction between supply and demand. Because each type
is found in unit mass, the aggregate demand for each type is precisely as written above. Note
that each type of investor has the same overall demands, except that the preference between
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shares, denoted α is reversed.9 Note also that (i) both investors demand fewer shares of either
stock when its price is higher, (ii) both can demand negative shares if the price is sufficiently
high, and (iii) higher values of α imply greater disagreement/divergence of preferences.10
Assume that shares of each stock are in unit net supply: NA = NB = 1. Also, assume that
there may be a short-sales constraint, such that an investor wishing to sell one share of stock
short can successfully short sell only λ ∈ [0, 1] shares. We partially endogenize the decision to
lend shares in Section 2.2, by incorporating an equity lending market and a fee for borrowing
shares. We look for the price of each stock as a stand-alone entity and the price that would
prevail if the companies merged, assuming no synergies.
The stocks’ prices depend on the level of disagreement. We define “low disagreement” as
the case where α ≤ 1/2 and “high disagreement” as the case where α > 1/2.
Proposition 1. The prices of both stocks are pA = pB = 1/2 if disagreement is low, and
pA = pB = λ+α(1−λ)
1+λ
> 1/2 if disagreement is high.
Proof. The equilibrium condition defining the price for each stock differs, depending on whether
the pessimists for that stock wish to be long or short. Without loss of generality, we can focus
on stock A, whose pessimistic investors are of type 2.
1. If investors of type 2 wish to be long, then the price is given by DA1 + D
A
2 = N
A, which
implies (1 + α− pA) + (1− α− pA) = 1, which implies pA = 1/2. At this price, demand
by investors of type 2 is DA2 = 1 − α − pA = 1/2 − α, so this price holds if and only if
α ≤ 1/2.
2. If investors of type 2 wish to be short, then they can short only λ times their demands.
Then the price is given by DA1 +λD
A
2 = N
A, which implies (1+α−pA)+λ(1−α−pA) = 1,
which implies pA = λ+α(1−λ)
1+λ
. At this price, demand by investors of type 2 is DA2 =
1− α− pA = 1−2α
1+λ
, which is negative if and only if α > 1/2.
9We relax this assumption in Online Appendix B.2 and find qualitatively similar results.
10Reduced-form models are useful in that they can nest many “micro-founded” models, but they are unap-
pealing if it is difficult to find micro-founded examples that fit the reduced form. It is important to establish
examples of micro-founded models that are consistent with any proposed reduced form. One simple example
that is consistent with our assumptions is presented in Online Appendix B.1.
7
So long as investors have similar opinions about a stock, its price is fixed at 1/2. However,
as disagreement increases to the point where one type of investor would prefer to be short at
that price, limits to short sales cause the price to rise above 1/2. Importantly, as α increases,
disagreement increases, but aggregate demand is unchanged.
These formulae for prices also allow us to evaluate comparative statics regarding the model’s
parameters.
Corollary 1. If disagreement is high, then prices are increasing in the level of disagreement
α, and decreasing in the availability of shares λ. The effect of disagreement on prices is larger
if fewer shares are available to borrow.
Proof. Focusing without loss of generality on stock A, if α > 1/2, then pA = λ+α(1−λ)
1+λ
. Then
dpA
dα
= 1−λ
1+λ
> 0, dp
A
dλ
= 1−2α
(1+λ)2
< 0, and d
2pA
dαdλ
= − 2
(1+λ)2
< 0.
What does it mean, in practice, for disagreement to be “high”? In the model, disagreement
is high whenever some investors are short. In practice, this is the case for nearly all firms, so
one could take all propositions and corollaries that condition upon disagreement being high
as applying generally. However, the model also assumes that there is always some constraint
on short demand. Propositions and corollaries that condition upon disagreement being high
are therefore conditional upon some limit to the ability of investors to sell short. Therefore,
high disagreement should be read to mean that there is sufficient short demand to induce some
limitation in the ability of some investors to sell short.
We are interested in how the prices of these two stand-alone firms compare to the price
that would arise if they were to merge. To calculate the price of the merged firm, we must
make some assumptions about how investors will demand shares, as a function of its price and
their demands for the stand alone entities. Any reasonable assumption will yield a value of the
merged firm that is identical to the aggregate value of the unmerged firms in the absence of any
frictions or synergies. This will require investors to have the same dollar holdings in the merged
firm if its market value is the same. The simplest assumption satisfying this requirement is
that demand for shares in the merged entity equals the combined demands for shares in the
separate entities, so we make this assumption.
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We note that we assume neither positive nor negative synergies, nor any other operational
differences in the assets that the firms hold, nor changes in the capital structure. Our interest
in this model is purely the asset-pricing implications of merging. We defer a discussion of
synergies to Online Appendix B.3.
Demand for the merged firm is therefore given by:
DM1 = D
A
1 +D
B
1 =
(
1 + α− pM) + (1− α− pM) = 2− 2pM
DM2 = D
A
2 +D
B
2 =
(
1 + α− pM) + (1− α− pM) = 2− 2pM .
Aggregate demand equals aggregate supply, which is NM = NA +NB = 2.
Let the diversification discount be the percentage amount that the merged entity is valued
below the combined values of the pure plays.11 That is, the diversification discount is
δ = 1− p
M
(pA + pB) /2
.
We now find the price of the merged firm, and the diversification discount, as a function of our
parameters.
Proposition 2. The price of the merged firm is pM = 1/2. If disagreement is low, then there
is no diversification discount, whereas if disagreement is high, then the diversification discount
is δ = α−1/2
α+( λ1−λ)
> 0.
Proof. The price of the merged firm can be found by setting aggregate demand equal to
aggregate supply: 4 − 4pM = 2, so pM = 1/2. If α ≤ 1/2, then pA = pB = 1/2, so the
diversification discount is δ = 1 − pM
(pA+pB)/2
= 1 − 1/2
(1/2+1/2)/2
= 0. If α > 1/2, then the
diversification discount is δ = 1− 1/2
(λ+α(1−λ)1+λ +
λ+α(1−λ)
1+λ )/2
= α−1/2
α+( λ1−λ)
> 0.
Effectively, if there is sufficient disagreement to generate a demand for shorting a stock,
then limits to short sales cause the pure-play firms to be priced above what would obtain
in the absence of such limits. However, there are no investors who want to sell short shares
in the merged firm, so the merged firm’s price is independent of the level of disagreement.
11We focus on a discount because it has been observed that conglomerates typically trade for a lower price
than the weighted average imputed from pure plays.
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This induces a diversification discount when disagreement is high. As before, we can evaluate
comparative statics regarding the diversification discount.
Corollary 2. If disagreement is high, then the diversification discount is increasing in the level
of disagreement α and decreasing in the availability of shares λ. So long as disagreement is not
too high (specifically, so long as α < 1 + λ
1−λ), the effect of disagreement on the diversification
discount is larger when fewer shares are available to borrow. Short interest is higher for the
pure plays than for the merged firm.
Proof. If α > 1/2, then δ = α−1/2
α+( λ1−λ)
. Then dδ
dα
=
λ
1−λ+1/2
(α+ λ1−λ)
2 > 0, and
dδ
dλ
= − α−1/2
(α+( λ1−λ))
2
(1−λ)2
<
0. d
2δ
dλdα
= − 1−α+(
λ
1−λ)
(α+( λ1−λ))
3
(1−λ)2
. This is negative if α < 1 + λ
1−λ .
These results are shown graphically in Figure 1. The diversification discount as a function
of the level of disagreement α is shown in the upper panel, for three levels of λ. When shares are
freely available to be borrowed (i.e., λ = 1), there is never a diversification discount. So long as
λ < 1, the diversification discount appears whenever disagreement is sufficient to generate short
sales, α > 1/2. In this region, higher disagreement induces a greater diversification discount,
more so when shares are less available to borrow. The diversification discount as a function of
the availability of shares is shown in the lower panel. If there is insufficient disagreement to
generate short sales, α < 1/2, then the availability of shares to short is irrelevant. However, as
long as there is sufficient disagreement, the diversification discount decreases as more shares
are made available to borrow, more so if the disagreement is greater.
We now allow for two extensions of the model, each of which will extend the insights beyond
our baseline model, but will also confirm the qualitative intuition that we have established thus
far.12
First, we allow the existence of different levels of disagreement across the two types of
investor. One type will want to hold similar numbers of shares of the two stocks, and the other
will have significantly different holdings of each type of share. We show that the diversification
discount arises from the combined level of dispersion in holdings in a simple, linear way. We
12In Online Appendices B.2 and B.3, we allow disagreement not only concerning which stock to each investor
favors, but also over the level of aggregate holdings and over the value of synergies in a merged firm. We do
not test predictions from these sections, so they are relegated to the Online Appendix.
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also show that changes in demand from either type of investor have equal effects on prices if
nobody is short. However, if somebody is short, then increased demand from long investors
has a larger impact on prices than does increased demand from short sellers.
Second, we partially endogenize the decision to lend shares and incorporate an equity
lending market with a price to borrow. This will allow results and figures closely mirroring
those in Blocher et al. (2013), who also incorporate an equity lending market in a format
similar to that which we use here. We show that the higher the prices to borrow shares of pure
plays, the greater the diversification discount.
2.1 Differing Levels of Disagreement
In this section, we allow the different types of investor to have differing variation in opinion
across stocks. For example, investors of type 1 might think the two stocks are fairly similar,
and have a low α, while investors of type 2 see them as fundamentally different, and have a
high α. Demand of investor type 1 is
DA1 = 1 + α1 − pA
DB1 = 1− α1 − pB,
while demand of investor type 2 is
DA2 = 1− α2 − pA
DB2 = 1 + α2 − pB.
Consider stock A in the case in which type 2 investors are short. The price is given by
DA1 + λD
A
2 = N
A, which implies that
(
1 + α1 − pA
)
+ λ(1− α2 − pA) = 1, which implies that
pA =
α1 + λ(1− α2)
1 + λ
.
What is the condition under which the stock would indeed be shorted by investor 2? 1− α2 −
pA < 0, which implies pA > 1− α2, which implies α1+λ(1−α2)1+λ > 1− α2. This can be rearranged
11
to become
α2 + α1 > 1
For stock A to be special, the two investors combined must have sufficient variation of
opinion to push the price above 1− α2. Interestingly, the same constraint applies to stock B.
Define the combined disagreement about the two stocks as the sum α1 + α2. Define high
combined disagreement as the case where α1 + α2 > 1 and low combined disagreement as the
case where α1 + α2 ≤ 1.
Proposition 3. The prices are given by pA = 1+(α1−α2)
2
and pB = 1+(α2−α1)
2
if combined dis-
agreement is low, and given by pA = α1+λ(1−α2)
1+λ
and pB = α2+λ(1−α1)
1+λ
if combined disagreement
is high.
Proof. Consider stock A.
1. If neither investor sells it short, then its price is given by DA1 +D
A
2 = N
A, which implies
(1 + α1 − pA) + (1− α2 − pA) = 1, which implies pA = 1+(α1−α2)2 . Investors of type 2 are
more pessimistic, and are long if and only if DA2 = 1 − α2 − 1+(α1−α2)2 = 1−α2−α12 > 0,
which is equivalent to α1 + α2 < 1. Clearly, the condition and price for stock B are
identical, except with α1 and α2 being swapped.
2. If investors of type 2 sell stock A short, then its price is given by DA1 +λD
A
2 = N
A, which
implies that (1 +α1− pA) +λ(1−α2− pA) = 1, which implies pA = α1+λ(1−α2)1+λ . Investors
of type 2 are more pessimistic, and are short if and only if DA2 = 1 − α2 − 1+(α1−α2)2 =
1−α2−α1
2
< 0, which is equivalent to α1 + α2 > 1. Clearly, the condition and price for
stock B are identical, except with α1 and α2 being swapped. An equivalent argument
yields the results for stock B.
To see why aggregate disagreement is critical, consider the case of stock A, and assume
that α1 + α2 = 1. The price of stock A is 1/2 and total demand is D
A
1 = 1 + α1 − 1/2 from
type 1 investors and DA2 = 1− α2 − 1/2 from type 2 investors. It should be obvious that if α2
increases, the stock price will fall: lower demand means a lower stock price. However, it will
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not fall enough for type 2 investors to avoid going short. Indeed, DA2 = 1− α2 − α1+λ(1−α2)1+λ =
1−α1−α2
1+λ
< 0.
Therefore, the stock will be overpriced relative to the setting in which naked shorting is
allowed, in which case the price is given by DA1 + D
A
2 = 2 + α1 − α2 − 2pA = 1, which means
that pA = 1+(α1−α2)
2
. The difference in price in the case where shorting is limited vs. not is
α1+λ(1−α2)
1+λ
− 1+α1−α2
2
= α1+α2−1
2
> 0.
It is immediately obvious that the two stocks have different prices. Demand for each stock
differs, so prices will differ. The precise difference is surprisingly simply written.
Corollary 3. The price of the stock whose optimistic investors hold a narrower range of
opinions is higher than the price of the stock whose optimistic investors hold a greater range
of opinions. The price difference is α1 − α2.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let α1 > α2. Suppose that α1 + α2 < 1. Then p
A − pB =
1+(α1−α2)
2
− 1+(α2−α1)
2
= α1 − α2 > 0. Now suppose that α1 + α2 > 1. Then pA − pB =
α1+λ(1−α2)
1+λ
− α2+λ(1−α1)
1+λ
= α1 − α2 > 0. In each case, stock A is more expensive, and its
optimistic investor has a more varied opinion.
This result should be intuitive: both greater optimism and lower pessimism imply higher
demand and a higher price.
We close this section with comparative statics analyses of the size of the diversification
discount as we vary the levels of disagreement α1 and α2, and the difficulty to short shares, λ.
Proposition 4. If combined disagreement is low, then there is no diversification discount,
whereas if combined disagreement is high, then the diversification discount is δ = (α1+α2−1)(1−λ)
(α1+α2−1)(1−λ)+(1+λ) >
0.
Proof. The price of the merged firm can be found by setting aggregate demand equal to
aggregate supply: DA1 +D
A
2 +D
B
1 +D
B
2 = 2, which implies
(
1 + α1 − pM
)
+
(
1− α1 − pM
)
+(
1− α2 − pM
)
+
(
1 + α2 − pM
)
= 4 − 4pM = 2, which implies pM = 1/2. If α1 + α2 >
1, then pA = α1+λ(1−α2)
1+λ
and pB = α2+λ(1−α1)
1+λ
, so the diversification discount is δ = 1 −
1/2(
α1+λ(1−α2)
1+λ
+
α2+λ(1−α1)
1+λ
)
/2
= (α1+α2−1)(1−λ)
(α1+α2−1)(1−λ)+(1+λ) > 0. If α1 + α2 ≤ 1, then the diversification
discount is δ = 1− 1/2( 1+(α1−α2)
2
+
1+(α2−α1)
2
)
/2
= 0.
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Similar to the base model, if there is sufficient combined disagreement, then limits to short
sales cause the pure-play firms to be priced above what would obtain in the absence of such
limits. There are no investors who want to sell short shares in the merged firm, however, so
its price is independent of the levels of disagreement. This induces a diversification discount
when disagreement is high. As before, we can evaluate comparative statics regarding the
diversification discount.
Corollary 4. If combined disagreement is high, then the diversification discount is increasing
in the level of disagreement α, and decreasing in the availability of shares λ. So long as
combined disagreement is not too high (specifically, so long as α1 + α2 <
2
1−λ), the effect of
disagreement on the diversification discount is larger when fewer shares are available to borrow.
Short interest is higher for the pure plays than for the merged firm.
Proof. If α1 +α2 > 1, then δ =
(α1+α2−1)(1−λ)
(α1+α2−1)(1−λ)+(1+λ) . Then
dδ
dα1
= dδ
dα2
= (1−λ)(1+λ)
[(α1+α2−1)(1−λ)+(1+λ)]2 >
0 and dδ
dλ
= −2(α1+α2−1)
[(α1+α2−1)(1−λ)+(1+λ)]2 < 0.
d2δ
dλdα1
= 2 (α1+α2−1)(1−λ)−(1+λ)
[(α1+α2−1)(1−λ)+(1+λ)]3 , which is negative if and
only if α1 + α2 <
2
1−λ .
We see these results in Figure 1. The diversification discount as a function of the level of
combined disagreement α1 + α2 is shown in the upper-right panel, for three levels of λ. When
shares are freely available to be borrowed, λ = 1, and there is never a diversification discount.
So long as λ < 1, the diversification discount appears whenever disagreement is sufficient
to generate short sales, α1 + α2 > 1. In this region, higher disagreement induces a greater
diversification discount, more so when shares are less available to borrow. The diversification
discount as a function of the availability of shares is shown in the lower-right panel. If there
is insufficient disagreement to generate short sales, α1 +α2 ≤ 1, then the availability of shares
to short is irrelevant. However, as long as there is sufficient disagreement, the diversification
discount decreases as more shares are made available to borrow, more so if the disagreement
is greater.
The additional complexity in this section provides comfort that the intuition captured by
the baseline model is robust: the core qualitative insights of the paper, that the diversification
discount is positive if and only if (stock-level) disagreement is high enough, and zero otherwise,
continue to hold. However, there are novel insights as well. Perhaps most interestingly, it is the
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combined disagreement across both types of investor that determines both the existence and
the size of the diversification discount. Whether the more optimistic or pessimistic investor is
associated with one or the other stock does not affect the level of the discount.
2.2 The Equity Lending Market
In our final extension of the baseline model, we allow for a somewhat more endogenous
choice of whether to lend shares. We have assumed thus far that only a fraction λ of short
demand can be satisfied. In this section, we allow all of it to be satisfied, but only at a price.
To the extent possible, we follow Blocher et al. (2013) in notation and graphical style. This
model is adapted from their more general model, with linear simplifications that allow their
model to apply to multiple stocks.
We allow investors to have both market-level and stock-level disagreement, so that it is
possible that some investors will choose to sell short the merged firm.13 Let pAs be the price
to borrow shares of stock A and pBs be the price to borrow shares of stock B. Let demand of
investor type 1 be
DA1 = 2− κ+ α− pA + γpAs
DB1 = 2− κ− α− pB + γpBs ,
while the demand of investor type 2 is
DA2 = κ− α− pA + γpAs
DB2 = κ+ α− pB + γpBs .
κ measures how much type 1 and type 2 investors disagree regarding their aggregate hold-
ings. If κ = 1, then both types of investor have identical demands as in the base model. As
κ rises above (falls below) one, type 1 investors hold more (less) stock overall than type 2
investors. Short sellers want to short less when the price to borrow shares is higher, and long
13In Online Appendix B.2, we solve an extension of the model with market-level disagreement but with ex-
ogenous equity lending. Further discussion of how we formulate market-level disagreement, see that Appendix.
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investors want to own more when they can lend shares at a higher fee. Because the price to
borrow shares is a flow cost and the price to buy is a one-time cost, we allow them to enter
the utility function differently. One could interpret the coefficient γ as the inverse of the cost
of capital, though this interpretation is not necessary for our results.
We assume that a fraction of long investors is willing to lend their shares of stock j to
shorts. For simplicity, let that fraction be λpjs: the higher a price at which they can lend
shares, the more they are willing to lend.
Consider the case of stock A. Equilibrium in the equity market requires DA1 + D
A
2 = N
A,
which implies 2− 2pA + 2γpAs = 1, which implies
pA = 1/2 + γpAs .
There are three ranges of parameters that imply different conditions for equilibrium in the
equity lending market.
1. If κ < 1/2+α, then investors of type 2 are short the stock. Then, equilibrium in the equity
lending market requires λpAs D
A
1 = −DA2 , which implies λpAs
(
2− κ+ α− pA + γpAs
)
=
− (κ− α− pA + γpAs ), which can be written as
pA =
λγ
(
pAs
)2
+ (2λ− κλ+ αλ+ γ)pAs + (κ− α)
1 + λpAs
.
Combining this equation with the stock market equilibrium equation yields equations
defining each price implicitly:
pA =
λγ
(
pA−1/2
γ
)2
+ (2λ− κλ+ αλ+ γ)pA−1/2
γ
+ (κ− α)
1 + λp
A−1/2
γ
pAs =
λγ
(
pAs
)2
+ (3λ/2− κλ+ αλ+ γ)pAs + (κ− α− 1/2)
(1 + λpAs ) γ
.
2. If 1/2 + α < κ < 3/2 + α, then no investors want to sell short and prices are given by
pA = 1/2, pAs = 0.
3. If κ > 3/2 + α, then investors of type 1 want to sell short. Then equilibrium in the
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equity lending market requires λpAs D
A
2 = −DA1 , which implies λpAs
(
κ− α− pA + γpAs
)
=
− (2− κ+ α− pA + γpAs ), which can be written
pA =
λγ
(
pAs
)2
+ (κλ− αλ+ γ) pAs + (2− κ+ α)
1 + λpAs
.
Combining this equation with the stock market equilibrium equation yields
pA =
λγ
(
pA−1/2
γ
)2
+ (κλ− αλ+ γ) pA−1/2
γ
+ (2− κ+ α)
1 + λp
A−1/2
γ
pAs =
λγ
(
pAs
)2
+ (κλ− αλ+ γ − λ/2) pAs + (3/2− κ+ α)
(1 + λpAs ) γ
.
Similarly, there are three inequalities relating κ and α that determine equilibrium conditions
for the prices of stock B, and three more for the merged stock M, which yield closed-form
solutions similar to those above. These nine cases are described in Section B.2 of the Online
Appendix.
For any given κ and α, there is a unique pair of prices such that both the stock market and
the equity lending market are in equilibrium. In cases in which prices are not pi = 1/2, pis = 0
for i ∈ {A,B,M}, each price is the solution to a quadratic equation, and in no case are
the equations neatly reduced. We therefore present three results that do not require clean
statements of prices.
We first note that the diversification discount can be written very simply in terms of the
prices to borrow shares. The diversification discount is defined as δ = 1− pM
(pA+pB)/2
. Plugging
in prices from the stock market equilibrium conditions yields
δ = 1− 1/2 + γp
M
s
(1/2 + γpAs + 1/2 + γp
B
s ) /2
=
pAs + p
B
s − 2pMs
1/γ + pAs + p
B
s
.
Thus, ∂δ
∂pAs
= ∂δ
∂pBs
= 1/γ+2p
M
s
(1/γ+pAs +p
B
s )
2 > 0 and
∂δ
∂pMs
= −2/γ−4p
M
s
(1/γ+pAs +p
B
s )
2 < 0. This allows us to state the
following empirical prediction.
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Claim 1. If the diversification discount is positive, then it is larger when the price to borrow
shares of the pure-plays is larger, and smaller when the price to borrow shares of the conglom-
erate is larger.
We emphasize that these are not comparative statics. We are not changing prices and
observing what happens to the diversification discount. Prices to buy and prices to borrow
move together as underlying parameters vary, and prices to buy determine the diversification
discount. It is true by definition that as the prices of pure plays increase and the price of
the merged firm falls, the diversification discount increases. It is true in equilibrium that, as
underlying parameters vary, the prices to borrow each share and the prices to own each share
move in the same direction, and higher prices to own are associated with higher prices to
borrow. It is therefore also true in equilibrium that higher prices to borrow pure plays and a
lower price to borrow the conglomerate are associated with a higher diversification discount.
Note that the diversification discount is linear with respect to the difference in the average
price to borrow the pure plays,
(
pAs + p
B
s
)
/2, and the price to borrow the conglomerate, pMs .
The denominator merely scales the prices so that they are in percentage terms rather than
dollar terms. The intuition for this relationship is straightforward: a higher price to borrow
shares means a higher unmet demand to short, which implies greater overpricing.
We can now state our second result as a direct implication of our first. If δ > 0, then
pAs +p
B
s −2pMs
1/γ+pAs +p
B
s
> 0, so
(
pAs + p
B
s
)
/2 − pMs > 0. Therefore, we can see that any set of parameters
will cause the borrowing fees to be lower for the conglomerate.
Claim 2. If the diversification discount is positive, then the conglomerate will have lower
borrowing fees and lower short interest.
If there is a diversification discount, then it must result from the conglomerate being easier
to sell short than the pure plays. Regardless of whether shorting is easier because there are
more shares available to borrow (λM > λA,B) or simply because there is less disagreement about
the conglomerate, the result is a higher fee difference and a larger diversification discount.
Finally, we present numerical solutions for prices in Figure 2. This graphic replicates Figure
3 in Blocher et al. (2013) by plotting curves representing equilibrium pairs of prices in both the
stock market and the equity lending market. For simplicity, κ = γ = λ = 1. Other choices of
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γ and λ affect the levels of prices, but they affect neither the qualitative shapes of these curves
nor the comparative statics. Alternative choices of κ cause a divergence in prices between the
two stocks, but offer qualitatively similar figures otherwise.
The solid curve represents all pairs of points satisfying equilibrium in the stock market,
namely pA = 1/2 + pAs . The three dashed curves represent pairs of equilibrium prices in the
equity lending market, namely pA =
(pAs )
2
+(2+α)pAs +(1−α)
1+pAs
, each for a given choice of α.
When there is low disagreement, α = 0.4, the equity lending equilibrium curve lies fully
above the stock market equilibrium curve, and the price to borrow shares is fixed at the zero-
lower bound. Then the equilibrium prices are pA = 1/2, and pAs = 0, shown as point 1 in
the figure. As disagreement increases and α = 0.6, the set of points allowing equilibrium
in the equity lending market shifts down. Equilibrium shifts to point 2, at which prices are
pAs = p
B
s = 0.064 and p
A = pB = 0.53. As disagreement continues to rise, to α = 0.8,
equilibrium shifts to point 3, at which pAs = p
B
s = 0.175 and p
A = pB = 0.59. Clearly,
increasing disagreement implies both rising prices and rising prices to borrow. Because the
price of the combined entity is fixed at 1/2, the diversification discount will increase right along
with prices.
Generally speaking, any change in parameters that causes an increase in the share price also
increases the price to borrow shares. Similarly, any shock that increases the price to borrow
shares also increases the share price. It should therefore be unsurprising that higher lending
fees for pure plays are associated with a higher conglomerate discount.
This relationship between prices and disagreement is plotted in Figure 3. It should be
clear that the qualitative results from our baseline model continue to hold when we partially
endogenize the choice to lend shares. We also find a novel implication, linking the price to
borrow shares with the diversification discount. This is critical for our empirical work, as the
price to borrow is a key measure of short-sales constraints.
2.3 Testable Hypotheses
We conclude this section by providing the testable implications of the model. For clarity,
we list the empirical predictions in the order in which they will be tested, not the order in
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which they arose in the theory.14 All hypotheses are supported by theory developed above,
but additional theory found in Online Appendix also provides support for these hypotheses.
When appropriate, we point readers to these additional results.
The first hypothesis is consistent with the intuition of Miller (1977), Bhandari (2016),
and Hwang et al. (2016). Testing it serves largely to confirm the validity of the assumptions
underlying the model. The second through fourth hypotheses are generated by the model and
have not been explored in prior work.15
Hypothesis 1. Differences of opinion are smaller for a conglomerate than for a
pure-play firm.
This hypothesis follows immediately from Proposition 2: the demand for the merged firm
is identical for the two investors, but differs by 2α for each pure-play firm, with α being
the difference in beliefs between investor types. Sometimes an analyst might be bullish
about one firm and bearish about another, while another analyst may be bearish about
the first and bullish about the second. If the firms were combined, these idiosyncrasies
would be partly mitigated. The lower variation in forecasted earnings for conglomerates
has precisely the same theoretical and statistical basis as the lower variation in demand
for conglomerates.
Hypothesis 2. Short-sales constraints are higher for pure-play firms than for con-
glomerates. If there is a diversification discount in our model, then it must result
from the conglomerate being easier to sell short than the pure-play firms. Regardless of
whether shorting is easier because there are more shares available to borrow (λM > λA,B)
or simply because there is less disagreement about the conglomerate, the result is a higher
fee difference and a larger diversification discount, as shown in Claim 2. Pure plays also
feature higher short interest, according to Corollaries 2, 4, and Claim 2.
14We offer a note on interpreting the model. The model is about relative prices of identical assets. For it
to be interpretable in practice, these prices should be adjusted relative to some benchmark. In the model, the
prices are for otherwise identical assets, so the comparison must be between assets that are comparable in some
way. The most natural way to compare is to use multiples of prices to other variables – earnings, assets, sales,
etc. “Price” in the model should be interpreted as a multiple.
15In addition to the testable hypotheses presented below, in the Online Appendix we provide examples of
our main empirical approaches using a sample of simulated data based on the model. The qualitative results
are quite similar between the simulated data and the real-world data.
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Hypothesis 3. The diversification discount is higher when the conglomerate has
a higher supply of shares available, and a lower fee for borrowing shares,
relative to the pure-play firm. If short-sales constraints exist, then a higher supply
of shares available to borrow means a lower price. This is true for pure plays in all
model specifications – Corollaries 1 and 4. For conglomerates, this is true when the
conglomerate may be sold short in equilibrium, which can occur when investors disagree
about either optimal aggregate holdings or the value of synergies created in a merger.
Both of these possibilities are explored in Online Appendix B.2 and B.3. The fact that
there typically exists a diversification discount, combined with Claim 1, implies that the
discount increases in relative fees.
Hypothesis 4. The diversification discount increases along with the level of dis-
agreement among owners of shares in pure-play firms, and the effect of dis-
agreement is larger when short sales are more constrained. This follows im-
mediately from Corollaries 1, 2, and 4. The reason is that disagreement and short-sales
constraints are complementary in increasing share prices. Without constraints, disagree-
ment does not increase prices. Without disagreement, constraints cannot increase prices.
Or, more precisely, without disagreement, constraints cannot exist as the demand for
shorting would not exist. Note that this is not a statement about the level of dis-
agreement among investors in different firms – rather, it concerns disagreement among
potential investors of one firm’s shares (for example, disagreement among investors in
General Electric stock, some of whom have high valuations while others have low val-
uations). In our model, the most pessimistic investors are willing to sell shares short
to the most optimistic ones, but may be prevented from doing so due to endogenously
determined short-sales constraints stemming from the equity lending market.
3 Data Construction
We combine several data sets with information about U.S. firms from January 2006 through
December 2015. Accounting data come from Compustat, analyst forecast data from IBES,
pricing data from CRSP, and institutional ownership data from Thomson-Reuters 13f files.
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Our proxies for short-sales constraints are based on equity lending market data provided by
Markit (see Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) and Porras Prado et al. (2016)). A detailed definition
of our measures is provided in Appendix A.
Our main focus is on the impact of short-sales constraints and differences of opinion on
the conglomerate discount (Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995)). A conglomerate
is defined as a firm that has more than one operating segment (based on 2-digit SIC codes)
reported in Compustat’s Segments file. The excess valuation of a conglomerate is based on
comparing its valuation multiples to those imputed from a “pseudo” benchmark of pure-play
firms. In this pseudo-conglomerate, we compute the weighted valuation ratio of pure-play firms
operating in the same segments as the conglomerate, using the conglomerate’s segment sales as
weights.16 Our main valuation multiple is the enterprise-value-to-sales ratio (EV/Sales). As in
Berger and Ofek (1995), we measure the conglomerate discount as the log of the ratio between
the conglomerate’s EV/Sales and the imputed EV/Sales multiples. Larger values of this ratio
imply a lower discount. We also compute the discount based on the market-to-book (MB)
ratio used by Lang and Stulz (1994) and Hwang et al. (2016) and defined as the difference
between the conglomerate’s MB and the imputed MB ratios, divided by the value of imputed
MB ratio. Finally, we also use firms’ assets and compute the discount using the EV/Assets
multiple similar to that used for EV/Sales.
Our main measure of differences of opinion is Analysts’ Dispersion, the standard deviation
of unadjusted analyst forecasts from IBES scaled by the absolute value of the mean earnings
forecast, similar to Diether et al. (2002). However, forecast dispersion can also reflect funda-
mental uncertainty about the stock (Abarbanell et al. (1995) and Anderson et al. (2005)), so
it is crucial to control for risk; a higher volatility of returns may also reflect higher uncertainty
about the underlying firm (e.g., Zhang (2006)). We use Stock Volatility, measured by the stan-
dard deviation of monthly stock returns during the previous 12 months from the annual report
date, as a control variable that is a proxy for risk when explaining differences in valuation
between conglomerates and diversified firms in all of our regression analyses.
Our measures of short-sales constraints are based on equity lending market data from
16Our results are similar if we use the median rather than the mean to compute imputed values.
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Markit and available from January 2006 through December 2015.17 For each firm, we have
daily information on the lendable supply of shares (Supply), the loan fee (Fee), and a Fee
Score computed by Markit. This variable captures the loan-weighted fee charged by lenders
based on Markit’s proprietary benchmark rate, where 0 indicates the cheapest and 5 the most
expensive stocks to borrow. Finally, we use Fee Risk as a measure of short-sales constraints,
defined as the standard deviation of the daily Fee in the 12 months prior to the announcement
date. This variable is used in Engelberg et al. (2016) and is shown to capture the risk that
stock loans become expensive, which can deter short-sales activity.
Finally, as additional control variables, we employ several characteristics used in prior
literature as the base set of variables. We use the log of the firm’s assets (Ln(Assets)), the
fraction of the firm held by institutions (Total IO), Amihud’s (2002) ILLIQ, the log of 1 +
analyst coverage (Ln(1+Analyst)), firm leverage (Leverage) using the book value of debt scaled
by total assets, capital expenditures as a fraction of assets (CAPEX ), and firm profitability
(EBIT/Sales).
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
In Table 1 we show basic descriptive statistics for our sample. Panel A presents results
for conglomerate firms – those reporting more than one operating segment in Compustat –
and differences relative to the benchmark pure-play firms, while Panel B focuses exclusively
on valuation measures using the imputed method.
In Panel A, we see that conglomerates on average report segment data for 2.58 divisions.
The mean lendable supply (Supply) is equal to 21.97% of market capitalization, 2.91 percentage
points bigger than that of pure plays. Conglomerates are generally cheap to borrow, with the
mean (median) annualized Fee being equal to 89 (10) bps, and have an interquartile range
(IQR) of just 11.5 bps. These figures are in line with those reported by D’Avolio (2002) and
Porras Prado et al. (2016). The standard deviation of loan fees, Fee Risk, is equal to 396.5
17More details about this data set can found in Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011), Aggarwal et al. (2015), and
Porras Prado et al. (2016).
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bps and is lower on average than that of pure-play firms. Institutions hold around 67.7% of
shares of conglomerates, with the average conglomerate being held by 163 institutions. The
average conglomerate is followed by 7.2 analysts, and the mean dispersion of annual earnings
forecasts is 7.48% of the mean absolute earnings forecast, smaller than the value found for pure
plays.18 The results provide initial support for our hypotheses. Conglomerates have lower short
interest, lending fees, fee volatility, analyst dispersion, and stock return volatility than pure
plays, as well as higher supply.
Table 1 About Here
In Panel B we present these statistics for conglomerates’ valuation multiples relative to
imputed values. The imputed value of X is defined as the sales-weighted average of X for
pure plays operating in the same SIC industry codes as the conglomerate. We find that con-
glomerates also exhibit lower excess valuation multiples than pure plays, regardless of whether
valuation is measured using EV/Sales (Berger and Ofek (1995)) or EV/Assets. We find that
MB ratios are slightly higher for conglomerates than for focused firms (Lang and Stulz (1994),
Custo´dio (2014), and Hwang et al. (2016)). However, these basic comparisons do not control
for differences in other firm-related characteristics, like size and liquidity, which we account for
using propensity score-matched samples in a regression framework in the upcoming sections.
4.2 Propensity Score Matching
One of the main criticisms of the methodology employed by Lang and Stulz (1994) and
Berger and Ofek (1995) is that matching conglomerates to imputed values from pure plays
compares “apples and oranges” by using benchmarks that are very different from their con-
glomerate counterparts. For instance, Hund et al. (2016) mention that “the Berger and Ofek
[1995] procedure matches diversified firms to focused firms that are 15 times smaller on av-
erage.” Conglomerates also tend to be older than pure plays. In the unmatched sample,
conglomerates are ten years older on average than focused firms (the mean age of conglom-
erates in Compustat is 25.6 years). Thus, the existence of the conglomerate discount might
18Only 68% of conglomerates satisfy the requirement of being covered by at least two analysts.
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be due to sample selection bias (e.g., Villalonga (2004b), Custo´dio (2014), and Hund et al.
(2016)). Matching a conglomerate to the imputed pseudo-conglomerate based on SIC industry
code-matching does not take into account differences in characteristics that can dramatically
affect statistical inference, such as profitability and sales. It is possible that the observed differ-
ences in valuation multiples between conglomerates and pure plays are simply due to intrinsic
differences between the two types of firms not captured in our prior linear specifications. If
this is true, then inference requires finding a properly balanced sample of firms.
Several papers address this issue by using propensity score matching (PSM) to control for
observable differences between conglomerates and focused firms. We follow Campa and Kedia
(2002) and Villalonga (2004b) and use PSM to randomize the likelihood of being diversified
relative to being a pure-play firm. This step ensures that the two groups are comparable along
characteristics that explain the likelihood of being a diversified company in the first place.
We employ a 1:1 nearest-neighbor method without replacement using a 0.01 caliper. In the
first stage, we use a logit regression to predict whether a firm is diversified, using observed
firm characteristics as controls and with heteroskedasticity-consistent analytical standard er-
rors proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2006). The first set of covariates we employ, which
we denote Base, includes the log of the firm’s assets (Ln(Assets)), the fraction of the firm
held by institutions (Total IO), Amihud’s (2002) ILLIQ, the log of 1 + analyst coverage
(Ln(1+Analyst)), firm leverage (Leverage) using the book value of debt scaled by total assets,
capital expenditures as a fraction of assets (CAPEX ), stock price volatility (Stock Volatil-
ity), and firm profitability (EBIT/Sales). All variables apart from Leverage are predictors of
diversification at the 1% significance level.
In the full sample, the treatment and control groups have very different probabilities of
being diversified. The propensity score is 0.285 for pure plays and 0.439 for conglomerates,
with the difference significant at the 1% level. Of the 8,096 conglomerate-year observations,
we find matches for 6,883, with the propensity-matched sample comprising 13,766 (=2*6,883)
observations. The matching algorithm using the Base set of covariates results in a propensity
score of 0.400 for the pure plays and 0.398 for the conglomerates, with the p-value of the
difference equal to 0.361. This suggests that the match is correctly identifying pure plays that
have a similar propensity to diversify as actual conglomerates. Campa and Kedia (2002) and
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Villalonga (2004b) find that the discount is reduced or disappears after constructing samples
that attempt to eliminate the imbalance between conglomerates and pure-play firms. From
here on, we use the propensity-matched sample in our tests.
In Table 2 we report statistics for means’ difference tests between conglomerates and pure-
play firms for the main variables of the paper across different samples. In Panel A, we display
results for the measures of short-sales constraints: Supply, Fee Score, and Fee Risk. The first
row, (Unmatched), has values for the unmatched sample, showing that short-sales constraints
measures and analysts’ forecast dispersion are lower for conglomerates than for diversified
firms, with all differences being statistically significant at the 1% level. The second row uses
the propensity-matched sample with the Base set of control variables to match firms. The
matching algorithm still cannot successfully account for differences in short selling constraints
and differences of opinion. Conglomerates have statistically significantly higher supply, lower
fees, and lower fee volatility compared to diversified firms. This is consistent with the predic-
tions made in Hypotheses 1 and 2 about the size of differences of opinions and of short-sales
constraints for conglomerates compared with pure-play firms. The final row, Base+SS+Beliefs,
adds Supply, Fee Score, Fee Risk, and Analyst Dispersion as additional covariates in the match-
ing equation. By design, the matching procedure generates a sample of firms with no statistical
differences related to short-sales constraints and analyst dispersion between conglomerate firms
and pure plays.
In Panel B, we display statistics for the valuation multiples. While conglomerates are
still priced lower than pure plays, the discount is smaller after matching, consistent with the
findings of Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004b). Using EV/Sales, the difference
between conglomerates and matched pure-play firms is equal to -4.69 in the unmatched sample
and -1.20 in the matched sample, a reduction of almost 75%. For the other valuation multiples,
MB and Ln(EV/Assets), the decrease in the discount is similar, showing the importance of
constructing a matched sample of firms. In the final row, we see that adding short-sales
constraints and analyst dispersion as covariates further reduces the conglomerate discount by
around 10%, highlighting the assertion that our proposed variables contribute to explaining
the conglomerate discount.
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Table 2 About Here
In summary, these results support our main hypothesis on the conglomerate discount:
proxies of differences of opinion and short-sales constraints affect its magnitude in a statistically
and economically meaningful way, although this effect cannot be fully explained.19
4.3 Differences of Opinion and Diversification
Hypothesis 1 states that conglomerates should have lower differences of opinion than pure
plays. As long as opinions about all of the divisions of a conglomerate are not perfectly corre-
lated, opinions about the group will be less varied than opinions about each component part.
In Table 3 we test Hypothesis 1 by estimating OLS regressions including both conglomerates
and pure-play firms, with firm- and year-fixed effects and with standard errors clustered at the
firm level.
Columns (1) and (2) display estimates using the standard deviation of analysts’ annual
earnings forecasts scaled by the absolute mean forecast (as demonstrated by Diether et al.
(2002)) as the dependent variable. We use two alternative measures of firm diversification as
explanatory variables: in column (1) #Segments is the number of different operating segments
reported in Compustat, while in column (2) D(Conglomerate) is an indicator variable equal
to one if the firm has more than one reported segment in Compustat, zero otherwise. In both
cases, we find that when a firm is diversified, the differences of opinion about its earnings are
smaller.20 For example, using analyst forecast dispersion in column (2), we have a statistically
significant estimate of -1.029 for the D(Conglomerate) variable, indicating that conglomerate
firms are associated with a 5.5% (=-1.029/21.68) standard deviation decrease in analyst fore-
cast dispersion (using the matched sample’s standard deviation). Our results are robust to
the inclusion of variables such as firm size, institutional ownership, liquidity, analyst coverage,
leverage, CAPEX, stock volatility, and profitability. Overall, our estimates support Hypothesis
1: conglomerates have smaller differences of opinion than pure-play firms.
19Our conclusions are qualitatively the same if we replace Fee Score with Fee as a measure of short selling
constraints, and if we use options’ open interest to measure differences of opinion.
20These results are also valid unconditionally in regressions without any controls.
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4.4 Short-Sales Constraints and Diversification
Hypothesis 2 states that short-sales constraints should be higher for pure plays than for
conglomerates. In columns (3)-(8), we test this hypothesis using three proxies for short-sales
constraints: lendable supply (Supply), loan fees (Fee Score), and loan fee volatility (Fee Risk).
In columns (3) and (4), we find that conglomerates have greater lendable supply than pure
plays for both measures of firm diversification. For example, the 1.376 coefficient estimated for
Supply in column (2) implies that conglomerates have greater lendable supply than pure plays,
equivalent to 12.5% (=1.376/10.95) of the conglomerates’ lendable supply standard deviation.
While lendable supply is directly related to the ease of shorting stocks, Kolasinski et al.
(2013) and Porras Prado et al. (2016) highlight how most stocks have a large slack supply in
the equity lending market. An alternative measure of short-sales constraints is the lending
fee paid to borrow shares, which captures the costs associated with shorting. In columns (5)
and (6), we use the loan fee score measure computed by Markit and find that diversified firms
have smaller lending fees than focused ones. Finally, columns (7) and (8) report results using
the Fee Risk measure proposed by Engelberg et al. (2016). The -0.292 coefficient estimated
for D(Conglomerate) in column (8) implies that the loan fee volatility is 9.1% (=-0.292/3.189)
of a standard deviation lower, on average, for conglomerates than for pure plays. Overall,
our results are economically significant and consistent with Hypothesis 2: pure-play firms face
higher short-sales constraints than conglomerates do.
4.5 Conglomerate Discount, Disagreement, and Short-Sales Con-
straints
Our previous results support the hypotheses that conglomerates have smaller differences of
opinion and fewer short-sales constraints relative to pure plays. In this section, we test Hypoth-
esis 3 by answering a simple question: are conglomerates relatively cheaper when benchmark
pure plays have larger differences of opinion and face relatively tighter short-sales constraints?
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We begin the analysis by comparing the valuation multiples of conglomerates, using groups
sorted according to the relative level of short-sales constraints and analysts’ dispersion. To
avoid the potential selection biases with the imputed approach used by Lang and Stulz (1994)
and Berger and Ofek (1995), we use the nearest pure-play neighbor in the propensity-matched
sample (Villalonga (2004b) and Custo´dio (2014)).
For every year, we compute the relative difference in short-sales constraints (using, respec-
tively, Supply, Fee Score, and Fee Risk) between a conglomerate and its nearest pure-play
neighbor in the propensity-matched sample and sort these firms into terciles. Then, within
each tercile, we further sort conglomerates according to the difference in analysts’ forecast
dispersion (Analysts’ Dispersion).
In Table 4, we display the excess EV/Sales valuation multiple of conglomerates in the
highest and lowest terciles for each combination of sorting variables. For example, using
Supply, we find that the mean EV/Sales for firms in the top tercile of Analysts’ Dispersion
and lowest tercile of Supply is equal to -0.236, while for those in the lowest tercile of Analysts’
Dispersion and highest tercile of Supply is equal to -0.661. We also display the difference
between conglomerates with high dispersion / high short-sales constraints and those with low
dispersion / low short-sales constraints. These are the portfolios that our model predicts should
have the largest difference in prices. The 0.425 difference is positive and statistically significant
at the 1% level. We find similar results for all other measures of short-sales constraints.21
Table 4 About Here
The results above provide support for our hypotheses in a simple univariate setting. How-
ever, there are a number of confounding variables that may affect the results as shown in
previous literature (e.g., Berger and Ofek (1995)). We address this issue by examining the
conglomerate premium/discount in a multivariate setting.
We analyze the conglomerate discount using a similar methodology to Custo´dio (2014),
comparing conglomerates and pure-play firms in a propensity-matched sample that minimizes
the sample selection bias. We contribute to the literature by including measures of differences
21Note that while the lowest terciles of Supply face the tightest short-sales constraints, for Fee Score and Fee
Risk we examine the highest tercile.
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of opinion, short-sales constraints, and their interaction. Our baseline regression is written as
follows:
Excess(Ln(EV/Sales))i,t = α1 + δD(Conglomerate)i,t + β1Imp(Dispersion)i,t + β2Imp(SS)i,t
+β3Imp(Dispersion)i,t ∗ Imp(SS)i,t + φ′Xi,t + κi + µt + i,t, (1)
Our dependent variable, Excess(Ln(EV/Sales)), is the difference between the logarithm of
a firm’s enterprise-to-sales multiple and an industry benchmark, defined as the average of all
pure-play firms operating in the same SIC industry 2-digit code as the firm. If the firm is a
conglomerate, we compute an imputed value as the benchmark, similar to the approach by
Berger and Ofek (1995). This imputed value is computed using the sales-weighted average of
the pure-play firms operating in each of the conglomerate’s segments. Furthermore, we also
compute a similar benchmark for each measure of differences of opinion and short-sales con-
straints (i.e. Imp(X) for variable “X ”). D(Conglomerate) is an indicator variable equal to one
if the firm is a conglomerate, zero otherwise. The variable Imp(Dispersion) is based on ana-
lysts’ forecast dispersion, while Imp(SS) uses one of three measures of short-sales constraints:
Supply, Fee Score, and Fee Risk. The matrix X includes time-varying firm characteristics as
control variables. All models include firm-fixed and year-fixed effects, with standard errors be-
ing clustered at the firm level. One can think of our tests as describing within-firm variation in
excess valuation measures due to variation in the level of differences of opinion and short-sales
constraints in the underlying pure-play benchmark firms.
Table 5 About Here
Table 5 displays our results. Column (1) shows the standard result that conglomerates
have lower valuation: the D(Conglomerate) coefficient is negative and statistically signifi-
cant, even when controlling for several firm characteristics and using a matched sample to
minimize selection bias. In column (2), we include measures of lending supply (Supply),
analysts’ forecast dispersion (Analysts’ Dispersion), and the cross-product between them,
Imp(Dispersion)*Imp(SS). If we perform a F-test comparing the D(Conglomerate) coefficient
estimated for each regression, we find a small but statistically significant decrease in the co-
30
efficient, from -0.241 to -0.228, equivalent to a 5% reduction in the conglomerate discount.
Furthermore, when it becomes easier to borrow shares in the benchmark firms (i.e., higher
Imp(Supply)), the excess valuation of the conglomerate also increases: the coefficient on
Imp(SS) is statistically significant and equal to 3.233. Critically, larger differences of opin-
ion about the imputed firm increase the impact of short-sales constraints on excess valuation,
consistent with Hypothesis 4. In column (2), the interaction term Imp(Dispersion)*Imp(SS)
is equal to 9.266 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. For example, in column (2),
for firms in the 25th percentile of Imp(Dispersion), the impact of a one standard deviation
increase in Imp(SS) results in a 0.076 standard deviation increase in Excess(Ln(EV/Sales)),
while for firms in the 75th percentile of Imp(Dispersion) that impact is equal to 0.092, a 21%
difference.
One potential concern with using Supply to measure short-sales constraints is that the eq-
uity lending market often has a large slack supply of shares (Kolasinski et al. (2013)). Thus,
an increase in supply may not necessarily be associated with a relaxation of short-sales con-
straints. One way to address this issue is to use price-based measures, such as the Fee Score
and Fee Risk, which capture costs associated with shorting a stock. In all cases we obtain
similar results.22
Overall, consistent with Hypotheses 3 and 4 of our model, an increase in short-sales con-
straints of benchmark firms is associated with a higher relative valuation of firms and this
effect increases with differences of opinion within the benchmark pure-play firms. The con-
glomerate discount is also lower following the inclusion of differences of opinion and short-sales
constraints measures, although it is still positive and statistically significant.
The predicted coefficient estimates for Imp(Dispersion), Imp(SS), and Imp(Dispersion)*Imp(SS)
are all clear from the comparative statics in the model. However, while differences of opinion
and short-sales constraints affect pricing, it is not clear whether the coefficient on D(Conglomerate)
should increase, shrink, or even disappear altogether as controls are added in columns (2)-(4).
Therefore, in Online Appendix A we present similar regressions using simulated data and the
pricing equations in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2. The results are qualitatively similar to
22Note that signs for Imp(SS) are negative when using Fee and Fee Risk as a proxy for short-sales constraints
because, opposite to Supply, an increase in their values implies higher short-sales constraints.
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the results in Table 5: the coefficient on D(Conglomerate) is constant as controls are added.
This provides some reassurance that the model captures the data well.
4.6 Diversification Events and Price Dynamics
We explore the price dynamics related to differences in short sales constraints and differ-
ences of opinion by conducting an event study based on pure-play firms diversifying events.
These events occur due to either internally-funded expansions or through M&As. In the 2008-
2015 period, we identify 330 diversification events and compare the excess EV/Sales valuation
multiple of a pure-play firm relative to the industry-average at the end of year t-1 to its value
on December-end of the fiscal year at time t, i.e., when the company reports being diversified
for the first time.23 We also compute the change in imputed measures of dispersion of opinion
and short sales constraints and use those measures as the main variables of interest.
Table 6 shows the results. The change in excess valuation after a diversification event
is negative. The -0.167 coefficient in column (1) means that diversifying on average reduces
excess valuation ratios. This is consistent with the literature showing that there is a conglom-
erate discount. Once we control for firm characteristics in column (2) the effect is no longer
significant. However, in columns (3)–(5), we add changes in dispersion and changes in short
sales constraints. Consistent with our main hypotheses, following a diversification event, an in-
crease in the imputed pure-plays short-sales constraints is associated with a larger reduction in
valuation multiples. The effect of constraints on valuation is also lower whenever the imputed
pure-plays also exhibit higher dispersion. Overall, this result shows, in a dynamic setting, that
our main hypotheses are evident in the data. In columns (6)–(8) we include the interaction
between dispersion and short sales constraints. While the coefficients have the correct sign,
they are not statistically significant. Although somewhat mixed, these dynamic results are
broadly supportive of our theoretical idea.
Table 6 About Here
23This timing is chosen to ensure that we avoid including the year in which the the firm was changing from
a pure-play to a diversified one.
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5 Extensions and Robustness Tests
5.1 Alternative Classifications of Firm Diversification
In Table 7, we test whether alternative classifications of firm diversification (Diversification
Proxy) still support the presence of a conglomerate discount and the significance of differences
in opinion and differences in short-sales constraints. We re-estimate the regressions in columns
(2)-(4) of Table 5, but replace the conglomerate indicator variable with three alternative mea-
sures of diversification employed by Custo´dio (2014). In columns (1)-(4) we use the number of
unrelated segments based on the 2-digit SIC codes reported in Compustat’s Segment files, while
columns (5)-(8) use the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI(Sales)) computed for the sales of all
segments of a firm reported in Compustat. This variable measures how concentrated sales are
among the reported segments of a firm, being equal to one for a pure-play. Similarly, columns
(9)-(12) use the HHI based on segments’ assets. In all cases, the estimated coefficients for
Imp(Dispersion), Imp(SS), and their cross-product have the same signs as those found in Ta-
ble 5. Furthermore, an increase in short-sales constraints of benchmark pure plays decreases
the excess valuation of companies, with the effect being even larger when benchmark firms
exhibit larger differences of opinion.
Table 7 About Here
5.2 Alternative Explanations for the Conglomerate Discount
Many alternatives have been advanced in the literature to explain the conglomerate dis-
count. In Table 8 we include several additional variables to rule out the possibility that the
explanatory power of differences of opinion and short-sales constraints is due to correlation
with omitted variables.24
Lamont and Polk (2002) show that the conglomerate discount reflects differences in risk
and expected returns between conglomerates and pure plays. For each firm in our sample,
we include the cumulative stock returns over the past 12 months (Past 12-month return) as a
24We constrain the sample such that only firms with data available for all additional measures are included.
33
measure of overvaluation. Overvalued firms exhibit higher disagreement and are more heavily
targeted by short sellers, which may lead to spurious correlation with short-sales constraints
measures and Analysts’ Dispersion. As expected, firms with relatively higher past valuations
than the matched comparable tend to have higher EV/Sales, but our main variables remain
significant.
Table 8 About Here
Another possibility for why firms diversify is an attempt by managers to reduce their
exposure to firm-specific risk (e.g., Amihud and Lev (1981)). Thus, we include Idiosyncratic
Risk, defined as the standard deviation of the residuals based on the Carhart (1997) four-
factor model of returns. This variable measures the volatility of the portion of returns that
cannot be hedged by standard risk factors. Managers may have high exposure to firm-specific
risk (e.g., human capital tied up in the company, employee stock options, etc.) and may be
unable to diversify their risk. Thus, they can lower their total risk by diversifying the firm,
which might make the firm pass up profitable opportunities and became relatively undervalued.
As expected, we find that firms with relatively larger idiosyncratic risk tend to have lower
valuations.
Mitton and Vorkink (2007, 2011) propose that the discount is related to compensation for
conglomerates’ lower upside potential (i.e., lower skewness). We control for this possibility
by including the skewness of abnormal returns (computed from residuals of Carhart’s (1997)
four-factor model).25 Investors pay a premium for focused firms due to their higher upside
potential (i.e., positive returns’ skewness). Consistent with Mitton and Vorkink (2011), we
find that firms with relatively higher abnormal skewness are associated with higher valuation
multiples, but the D(Conglomerate) is lower but still significant. Overall, while all of these
variables suggested by previous literature have some degree of explanatory power, Imp(SS)
and Imp(Dispersion) still remain significant in all cases, consistent with our hypotheses.
25Our results are similar if we use the skewness of raw returns rather than abnormal ones.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we take the ideas in Miller (1977) to establish a new driving force for the
conglomerate discount. We provide evidence, from both theoretical and empirical standpoints,
that disagreement and short-sales constraints matter in the valuation of conglomerates. We
develop a model showing that when two assets are combined (e.g., a merger between firms),
the price of the combined assets will be lower than if the individual components were traded
separately. We establish the following pricing implications: (1) firms have higher prices when
it is costlier to short them; (2) firms have higher prices when differences of opinion are higher;
and (3) these two effects are complementary.
Empirically, we find strong support for the model’s key implications. Conglomerates have
smaller differences of opinion and fewer short-sales constraints than pure-play firms. While the
model is agnostic about whether conglomerates on average are traded at a premium or at a
discount relative to benchmark pure-play firms, we find that variation in differences of opinion
and short-sales constraints are significant predictors of valuation differences. Greater differ-
ences of opinion and short-sales constraints faced by benchmark pure-play firms are associated
with an increase in valuations relative to the benchmark firms. This effect is stronger when
the benchmark firms exhibit both characteristics at the same time. These results hold using
alternative sample construction methods, and for several measures of short-sales constraints;
using other firm controls such as size, institutional ownership, and liquidity; and for alternative
explanations for the conglomerate discount.
Taken together, we find that the hypotheses derived from the model are broadly supported.
While we are unable to fully explain the conglomerate discount, using proxies of differences of
opinion and short-sales constraints consistently contribute to reduce the difference in value be-
tween conglomerates and pure-play firms. Unlike existing work, our approach assumes neither
the existence of synergies nor any other operational differences in the assets that the conglom-
erates hold. In fact, previous explanations are all based on corporate financial and statistical
methodology differences, while our explanation arises purely from asset-pricing considerations.
We establish that differences of opinion combined with short-sales constraints, as a limit to
arbitrage, explain a significant fraction of the conglomerate discount.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1. Diversification Discount and Differences of Opinion
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The left-hand panels plot the diversification discount in the baseline model, with symmetric optimism
and pessimism among investors. In the upper-left panel, when the level of disagreement α is less
than 0.5, no investors ever hold short positions so the discount is zero. For α > 1/2, increasing
disagreement yields higher discounts. The problem is exacerbated because there are fewer shares to
borrow, represented as a decrease in λ. In the lower-left panel, as the number of shares available to
borrow, λ, increases, the diversification discount decreases. The greater the level of disagreement α,
the more the discount falls with λ. The right-hand panels replicate the results of the left-hand panels
in the setting in which different investors have differing variation in opinion. Numbers are identical
as in the left-hand panels, with the substitution α1 + α2 = 2α.
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Figure 2. Equilibrium: Stock Market and Equity Lending Market
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This figure replicates Blocher et al.’s (2013) Figure 3, in the setting of this paper. Equilibrium requires
equilibrium in the stock market, represented by the solid line, and equilibrium in the equity lending
market, represented by dashed lines. Each of the three dashed lines is associated with a particular
level of disagreement, α, and the importance of the equity lending price on short demand, γ, is set
to unity. When disagreement is low, represented by α = 0.4, the price to borrow shares is bounded
below by zero, and the equilibrium price is given by the intersection of the stock market equilibrium
curve with the vertical axis, point 1, at which p = 1/2. As the level of disagreement α rises to 0.6,
the curve representing equilibrium in the equity lending market falls, and equilibrium shifts to point
2. Here, the price to borrow shares has risen to 0.064 and the price of each stock has risen to 0.53. As
disagreement continues to rise, to α = 0.8, equilibrium shifts to point 3, at which the price to borrow
shares is 0.175 and the price to buy has risen to 0.59.
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Figure 3. Equilibrium: Stock Market and Equity Lending Market
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This figure plots the prices to borrow and buy shares, represented by the equilibrium points in Figure
3, as a function of the level of disagreement, α. For α < 1/2, nobody takes a short position, and
increases in disagreement do not affect prices. Once α > 1/2, one type of investor takes a short
position and further increases in disagreement lift both prices. Because the price of the combined
entity does not increase as disagreement increases, the diversification discount increases in α for
α > 1/2.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
The table shows descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the analysis using data from
January 2006 through December 2015. Equity lending data are provided by Markit, price data come
from CRSP, ownership data from SEC’s 13f holdings, accounting data from Compustat, earnings
forecasts from IBES, and options data from Option Metrics. Panel A shows characteristics for the
10,923 conglomerate-years of observations; i.e., yearly data from firms with more than one segment
reported in the Compustat Segment files. The next-to-last column, Diff. to PP shows the difference
of means relative to pure-play firms. Panel B shows statistics for the imputed value of the valuation
multiple X, defined as the sales-weighted average of X for pure plays operating in the same 2-digit
SIC industry codes as the conglomerate. We report values for three alternative valuation measures:
EV/Sales is the ratio between the conglomerate’s enterprise value over sales ratio divided by the
imputed ratio from the pure plays. MB is the ratio between the conglomerate’s market-to-book ratio
and the imputed market-to-book ratio. EV/Assets is the ratio between the conglomerate’s enterprise
value over assets ratio divided by the imputed ratio from the pure plays. Detailed variable definitions
are given in Appendix A.
Panel A: Conglomerates
Variable Mean Median St. Dev. 25th Pct. 75th Pct. Diff. to PP Obs.
#Segments 2.58 2.00 0.92 2.00 3.00 - 10,923
HHI(Sales) 0.63 0.60 0.20 0.50 0.79 - 10,923
HHI(Assets) 0.67 0.59 4.24 0.50 0.78 - 9,208
Supply (% Mktcap) 21.97% 23.55% 10.76% 14.95% 29.63% 2.91%*** 10,923
Short Interest (% Mktcap) 4.47% 2.72% 5.13% 1.20% 5.72% -0.65%*** 8,293
Fee (x100) 89.15 10.08 480.84 6.90 18.39 -87.78*** 10,923
Fee Score 0.47 0.00 1.21 0.00 0.00 -0.40*** 10,923
Fee Risk (x100) 396.49 352.76 306.29 151.22 568.48 -89.45*** 10,888
Analysts’ Dispersion 7.48% 2.03% 19.96% 0.95% 5.19% -2.99%*** 7,937
Assets 16,251 1,740 83,622 484 6,765 13019*** 10,923
Total IO 67.73% 74.59% 25.77% 52.43% 87.63% 6.53%*** 9,361
ILLIQ 1.80 0.04 12.39 0.01 0.26 -1.42*** 10,867
Analyst Coverage 7.18 5.00 7.45 1.00 11.00 1.43*** 10,923
Leverage 25.52% 23.43% 20.39% 8.46% 37.56% 2.85%*** 10,902
CAPEX 4.71% 3.16% 5.22% 1.49% 6.06% 0.08% 10,909
Stock volatility 37.77% 31.44% 24.50% 21.74% 46.31% -8.22%*** 10,828
EBIT/Sales 16.21% 17.58% 64.13% 10.30% 27.81% 58.06%*** 10,824
Cash Holdings 12.39% 7.61% 13.78% 2.84% 16.93% -12.02*** 10,921
Idiosyncratic Risk 2.10% 1.72% 1.47% 1.17% 2.55% -0.59%*** 10,845
Imputed Skewness 0.23 0.19 1.27 -0.30 0.75 -0.03* 10,855
EV/Sales 2.32 1.39 5.57 0.81 2.37 -5.95*** 10,902
MB 2.49 1.69 3.07 1.09 2.78 2.49*** 10,603
EV/Assets 1.26 1.01 0.94 0.74 1.50 -0.63*** 10,902
12m Returns 0.03 0.04 0.22 -0.08 0.14 0.01*** 9,936
12m DGTW Abn. Ret. 0.00 0.00 0.18 -0.09 0.09 0.01*** 9,936
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.10
Panel B: Conglomerate Discount Measures using Imputed Method
Variable Mean Median St. Dev. 25th Pct. 75th Pct. Diff. to PP
Excess(Ln(EV/Sales)) -1.62 -1.30 1.55 -2.44 -0.49 -0.33***
Excess(Ln(MB)) -0.65 -0.62 0.83 -1.12 -0.15 0.01***
Excess(Ln(EV/Assets)) -0.42 -0.40 0.58 -0.76 -0.07 -0.08***
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.10
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Table 5: Conglomerate Premium/Discount, Equity Lending, and Differences of Opinion
This table displays regressions of a measure of excess firm value as a function of differences of opinion and
short-sales constraints using a propensity-score matched sample with data from January 2006 through December
2015. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the ratio between a firm’s EV/Sales divided by the EV/Sales
benchmark computed from the average of pure plays operating in the same 2-digit SIC code. For conglomerates,
we use the sales-weighted average of the pure-play firms operating in each of the conglomerate’s reported
segments as in Berger and Ofek (1995), where Imp(X) is the imputed mean value of X. D(Conglomerate) is
an indicator variable equal to one if the firm reports data for more than one segment on Compustat, and zero
otherwise. Dispersion is the standard deviation of analysts’ annual earnings forecasts divided by the absolute
value of the mean forecast in IBES, while SS is one of the following measures of short-sales constraints: Supply
is lendable supply as a fraction of market capitalization, Fee Score is a measure of daily borrowing costs
computed by Markit going from 0 (cheapest) to 5 (most expensive), and Fee Risk is the standard deviation of
loan fees in the previous 12 months. We use values on the reporting date of the earnings announcement. The
covariates used on the first stage to create the matched sample are: total assets (Ln(Assets)), institutional
ownership (Total IO), Amihud’s (2002) ILLIQ, log of 1 + analyst coverage, Leverage, CAPEX, EBIT/Sales,
and Stock Volatility. All regressions include firm- and year-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm
level are reported in brackets.
SS Variable: None Supply Fee Score Fee Risk
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
D(Conglomerate) -0.241*** -0.228*** -0.238*** -0.233***
[0.050] [0.048] [0.049] [0.049]
Imp(Dispersion) -1.297*** 0.521*** 1.454***
[0.250] [0.098] [0.263]
Imp(SS) 3.233*** -0.160*** 0.024
[0.879] [0.041] [0.018]
Imp(Dispersion)*Imp(SS) 9.266*** -0.253*** -0.206***
[1.503] [0.083] [0.040]
Ln(Assets) 0.073** 0.084** 0.085** 0.074**
[0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.037]
Total IO 0.655*** 0.619*** 0.667*** 0.647***
[0.103] [0.103] [0.103] [0.103]
ILLIQ -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001*
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Ln(1+Analyst) 0.033* 0.035* 0.030 0.033*
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020]
Leverage 0.213* 0.198* 0.209* 0.212*
[0.121] [0.119] [0.120] [0.121]
CAPEX 0.444 0.412 0.403 0.476*
[0.287] [0.279] [0.286] [0.285]
Stock Volatility 0.016 0.017 0.025 0.017
[0.050] [0.050] [0.050] [0.050]
EBIT/Sales -0.157*** -0.159*** -0.161*** -0.158***
[0.026] [0.026] [0.027] [0.026]
Obs. 13,765 13,752 13,752 13,752
Firms 3,209 3,208 3,208 3,208
Adj. R2 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.10
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